Tell me what you see and I’ll tell you if you’re gay: analysing the advocate general’s opinion in case C-473/16, F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal by Ferreira, Nuno & Venturi, Denise
Tel me what you see and I’l tel you if you’re gay: Analysing the Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-473/16, F v Bevándorlási és Álampolgársági Hivatal
By Nuno Ferreira and Denise Venturi
Hungary in the spotlight again
Hungary has been in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons for quite a while. From legislation
targeting ‘foreign-operating universities’ to border walls to keep refugees from entering Hungarian
territory, the populist right-wing government of Viktor Orban has been sparking outrage in many
sectors of Hungarian society, and the European institutions. The most recent reason for alarm
again relates to migration and refugees, an area of widespread criticism of Hungarian authorities.
Building on extremely hostile policies towards refugees that have been admonished by both the
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights
(ECtHR),  Hungarian  authorities  now  intend  to  resort  to  highly  dubious  means  to  assess  the
applications  of individuals claiming asylum on grounds related to their sexual orientation. It was
already public knowledge that this category of claimants was subjected to poor treatment by the
Hungarian authorities, but recent events suggest that the authorities have reached  a new low.
The most recent incident came to the public knowledge through a reference for a preliminary
ruling to the CJEU by the Hungarian Administrative and Labour Court Szeged on 29 August 2016
in the Case C‑473/16, F v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (the ‘F case’). The case concerns
a Nigerian national who had submitted an application for international protection in Hungary based
on his sexual orientation, and dealt with the use of projective personality tests and other means for
‘proving’ sexuality. The Hungarian domestic court posed two questions to the CJEU, essentially
asking whether the application of Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC, in the light of Article 1
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter),  precludes forensic
psychologists’ expert opinions based on projective personality tests from being used in asylum
adjudication relating to LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex) claimants. Should that
possibility  be  precluded,  the  referring  Court  then  asks  whether  the  asylum  authorities  are
prevented from examining by expert methods the truthfulness of these claims.
The  questions  thus  refer  to  the  interpretation  of  particular  provisions  of  Council  Directive
2004/83/EC. Yet, the material facts under analysis in the case referred to the CJEU occurred in
April 2015, so the law that applies to the facts and that needs to be interpreted in this case is the
successor to Council  Directive 2004/83/EC – Directive 2011/95/EU of  13 December 2011 (the
recast Qualification Directive) – in force since 22 December 2013.
Following  the  hearing  on  13  July  2017,  Advocate  General  Wahl  delivered  his  Opinion  on  5
October 2017. The focus of our analysis will be on this Opinion, but first it is important to recall the
case law the CJEU has already produced on sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) claims
of asylum. Indeed, this is the third case the CJEU has dealt with on SOGI-related asylum claims,
and  we expect  this  third  case to  better  reflect  international  standards  than the previous two,
particularly in the light of the EU Charter and UNHCR Guideline No. 9.
Third time lucky?
The CJEU dealt with Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) asylum claims for the first
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time in the joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12, X, Y and Z v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel.
Despite some shortcomings,  this decision expressly recognised that persecution on the basis of
sexual orientation can give rise to refugee status under the ‘particular social group’ ground of the
1951 Refugee Convention. It was however one year after X, Y and Z that the CJEU was called to
provide guidance on evidentiary standards in SOGI asylum claims in another case concerning
three gay men seeking asylum on the basis of their sexual orientation, who were not deemed
credible (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13, A, B and C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en
Justitie, 2 December 2014). The CJEU was asked whether the Charter, in particular Articles 3
(right to the integrity of the person) and 7 (respect for private and family life), as well as Article 4
recast Qualification Directive posed certain limits on national authorities when verifying an asylum
seeker’s sexual orientation.
This  judgment  is  important  as it  establishes  some core principles on credibility  and evidence
assessment; however, the Court could have offered more positive guidance in that regard. At the
outset, the CJEU found that although the applicants’ mere declarations are not sufficient per se to
establish their sexual orientation, authorities are bound by certain limits when assessing a SOGI
asylum application. Notably, such assessment must be conducted on an individual basis and must
not be based merely on stereotypes, which is a mistake too often committed by decision-makers
in  SOGI  cases.  Nonetheless,  the  CJEU  did  not  completely  overrule  the  use  of  stereotyped
notions, but considered them a useful element in the overall assessment. As for evidence, the
Court precluded the recourse to detailed questions on sexual practices and to ‘tests to establish
applicants’ sexual orientation in light of Articles 1 (human dignity) and 7 of the EU Charter. It also
banned the production in  evidence of  films showing the applicant’s  engagement  in  same-sex
activities. Finally, the CJEU also affirmed that late disclosure of an applicant’s sexual orientation
as the main reason for the asylum claim, does not per se impinge on the applicant’s credibility.
In a nutshell, the Court gave a ‘black list’ of what authorities cannot do, but it did not provide any
clear guidelines of what, they should do to assess SOGI asylum claims. Notably, the Court made it
clear that there is no room for evidence that, by its nature, infringes human dignity and which does
not have any probative value. This prohibition, the Court argued, cannot be circumvented even if it
is the applicant’s choice to submit such evidence, as this would incite other applicants to do the
same, creating a de facto requirement. While the Court’s judgement in X, Y and Z fully establishes
the possibility of recognising SOGI applicants as refugees, the Court’s findings in A, B and C
constitute the backdrop against which the F case will ultimately be decided.
‘Tell me what do you see… is it gay enough?’
The F case has put back on the CJEU’s agenda the evidentiary standards to be applied in SOGI
asylum cases.  Several  contentious practices have been criticised throughout the years in this
context, from the use of stereotyped questioning to authorities resorting to practices of no medical
or psychological value such as phallometry, whereby reactions of gay male asylum claimants to
watching pornography were supposed to indicate their sexual preferences. Despite such practices
having been highly criticised both by the UNHCR and NGOs, the F case makes it clear that they
persist in different ways.
The precise tests in question in this case are the ‘Draw-a-Person-in-the-Rain’ test, Rorschach test
and Szondi test.  Such projective, drawing tests attempt to elicit  information that ‘patients’ may
struggle  or  prefer  not  to  verbalise  otherwise,  helping  psychologists  to  form an  opinion  about
individuals’  personality,  emotional  well-being  and  mental  health.  These  tools  are  generally
contentious, even if they go on being used by psychologists routinely in most countries. Their use
to  determine  one’s  sexuality  is  fundamentally  abhorrent,  thus  simply  not  considered  by  the
relevant literature or reputable professionals.
AG Wahl recognises how scientifically discredited such tests are in relation to sexual orientation
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matters, citing an American Psychological Association 2009 report. The question of whether one is
gay or not is, itself, poorly framed, as one’s sexual orientation can lie somewhere along a complex
continuum and change overtime. Attempts to determine one’s sexuality objectively have invariably
been held to be ‘junk science’, for relying on baseless stereotypes. As Weber has rightly stated in
the  context  of  the  recent  debates  around  using  Artificial  Intelligence  (AI)  to  determine  one’s
sexuality  on  the  basis  of  one’s  face,  such  pseudo-scientific  efforts  are  attempts  to  impose
coherence on individuals and fail to recognise that the ‘homosexual’ and the ‘heterosexual’ are
historically constructed figures. Crucially, Weber worries that such type of AI ‘junk science’ will be
used in the West in the context of SOGI asylum.
The tests in question in the F case assume that individuals with a particular sexual orientation
have certain personality traits, which not only is patently false, but also runs against the prohibition
on stereotypical decision-making established by A, B and C. At the oral hearing in this case, the
Hungarian authorities tried to justify the use of these tests with the A, B and C  judgment. The
argument ran as follows: as the judgment precluded questions about claimants’ sexual orientation,
the authorities had to resort to tests. The problem with this assertion is that it is based on a false
premise: the judgment in A, B and C did not prevent authorities from asking any questions about
claimants’  sexual orientation, but simply precluded certain questions and practices that  clearly
breach the dignity of the individual.
Although both the Commission and the Hungarian authorities suggested in the oral hearing that
these tests should be allowed because they only constitute an element of the overall assessment
of the asylum claim and may lead to the confirmation of the credibility of the applicant, the exact
opposite  happened  in  this  case.  Indeed,  the  test  was  used  by  the  Hungarian  authorities  to
discredit the applicant’s account and deny him international protection (par. 10-11 of the Opinion).
In other words, a ‘junk science’ approach to decision-making was used to prevent the claimant
from being recognised as refugee. Unfortunately, AG Wahl’s Opinion fell far short from precluding
such tests.
The Advocate General’s Opinion
In  his  Opinion,  AG  Wahl  rightly  frames  this  case  as  one  that  is  very  clearly  about  using
psychologists’ expert opinions in assessing the credibility of claimants. The provision at the centre
of this debate – as framed by the referring questions – is Article 4(5) of the recast Qualification
Directive,  which  discharges  applicants  from  the  need  to  prove  their  asylum  claims  through
documentary or other evidence when a range of conditions is fulfilled, including the applicants
having made a genuine effort to substantiate their claims, having offered a satisfactory explanation
for the lack of further evidence, and having provided an overall credible account. Based on this
provision, the applicant used the oral hearing to highlight that there was no need for any further
tests  in  his  case,  because there were no inconsistencies.  The Hungarian authorities  counter-
argued  that  there  were  contradictions  in  the  applicant’s  statement  (without  specifying  exactly
which contradictions), so it was necessary to probe its veracity.
Another  EU  law  instrument  turns  out  to  play  a  more  important  role  in  this  Opinion,  namely
Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive). Indeed, the Qualification Directive
establishes  the  general  rules  to  follow in  terms of  evidentiary  standards  in  asylum cases,  in
particular Article 4, but it is Article 10(3) of the Asylum Procedures Directive that determines that
Member States’ asylum authorities should reach individual, objective and impartial decisions, and
that they have the possibility to seek expert advice to assist in their  decision-making. On this
basis, AG Wahl proceeds by considering the benefits of involving psychologists in the adjudication
process (para. 33-34), but is also very clear about the impossibility of a psychologist determining
an applicant’s sexual orientation based on personality tests (par. 36). Nonetheless, AG Wahl goes
on to analyse under which circumstances such tests can nevertheless be admitted, thus effectively
accepting them.
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AG Wahl tries to soften the blow of  admitting the tests in question by stating that  consent is
required, and that the tests need to be carried out in a way that is compatible with the rights to
dignity and to respect for private and family life (Articles 1 and 7 of the EU Charter and Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights).  Although AG Wahl  expressly  acknowledges the
difficulties in withholding consent in the context of an asylum claim, he does not seem to find it
problematic that – in his own words and in a likely violation of the applicant’s rights under EU law –
the ‘applicant’s refusal [to consent to the tests] may have certain consequences that the applicant
himself has to bear’ (par. 45). In other words, refusing a test with no probative value that could
violate applicants’ rights may lead to the refusal of their asylum claim – a highly disproportional
and unfair outcome, we would argue.
The Opinion goes on to further qualify the admissibility of such tests by questioning the probative
value of examinations based on dubious science or used in the wrong context (par. 48). And yet,
AG Wahl also offers domestic courts a wide margin of appreciation in this regard, by stating that it
is not for the CJEU to assess such tests. Having seen how the tests in question had been used in
relation  to  a  gay  male  applicant  to  deny  him asylum,  it  is  patently  unwise  to  offer  domestic
authorities such leeway in asylum cases relating to sexual orientation. The fact that  AG Wahl
refers to the right to an effective remedy (Article 47 of the EU Charter) and to the freedom of
domestic courts to depart from the ‘findings of the expert’ (par. 50) may be an implicit suggestion
that the domestic court in this case should differ from the experts’ opinions and feel free to grant
asylum to the applicant.  Yet,  that  is  clearly  insufficient  to appease the legitimate concerns of
asylum seekers in similar situations, since they will be at the mercy of (administrative and judicial)
authorities who may happily offer probative value to ‘junk science’  detrimental  to their  asylum
claims.
AG Wahl’s Opinion accepting in principle the use of projective personality tests in cases involving
asylum claims on the basis of sexual orientation is deeply disconcerting. On the one hand, he
clearly doubts the usefulness or appropriateness of such tests (even referring to Principle 18 of
the Yogyakarta Principles protecting individuals from medical abuses based on sexual orientation
or gender identity),  and he alerts domestic courts to the possibility of  disregarding them even
when they are carried out. On the other hand, he does recommend that such tests should be
allowed (even if with a range of supposedly helpful caveats), thus abandoning claimants to the
mercy  of  potentially  unsympathetic  domestic  authorities.  Equally  disconcerting is  the  fact  that
nowhere in the AG’s Opinion is there a reference to the principle of the benefit  of the doubt:
although it may not be strictly necessary to refer to this principle in this context, its absence is
striking for leaving out of the equation an essential element of the evidentiary standards in refugee
law (para.  203-204  of  the UNHCR Handbook and  Guidelines  on  Procedures  and  Criteria  for
Determining Refugee Status). It is submitted that the focus of the Opinion should have been on
the line of questioning that should have been used, such as per UNHCR Guideline No. 9.
he Opinion in this case could have much more simply asserted,  as AG Sharpston did in her
Opinion in A, B and C (largely followed by the CJEU), that ‘medical [or psychological, we would
add] tests cannot be used for the purpose of establishing an applicant’s credibility, as they infringe
Articles 3 and 7 of the Charter’ (par. 61), and that applicants’ consent is both essentially irrelevant
and questionable (par. 67). Instead, AG Wahl offers poor guidance to the CJEU.
‘Projecting’ this Opinion onto the CJEU’s Judgment
In the F case, the CJEU will be called upon to interpret EU law with regard to the evidentiary
assessment of SOGI asylum cases in a more targeted way than it did in A, B and C. Predicting a
Court’s verdict is something one should try to avoid; however, the relevance of the issues at stake
in the F case allows us to contemplate some potential scenarios. First, the CJEU has the option to
build on and expand its approach in A, B and C and therefore construe its whole reasoning on the
basis of respect for the EU Charter, particularly Article 1. In this sense, psychological personality
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tests to evaluate sexual orientation would be precluded, as the prohibition set forth by the CJEU in
A, B and C  is arguably not  limited to physical  examination, but  extends more generally to all
‘“tests” with a view to establishing […] homosexuality’. Secondly, should the CJEU follow the AG’s
opinion, it would need to carefully construe how it is possible to ensure that psychologists’ expert
opinions are truly limited to an evaluation on the general credibility, and not just a loophole to pave
the way to unreliable psychological assessments of sexual orientation.
Further, the Court should make sure that any such expert opinions on credibility are not used as
‘lie  detectors’  based on preconceived assumptions – otherwise we could  well  resort  to Harry
Potter’s  veritaserum  for  all  asylum  claims.  Moreover,  the  CJEU  would  need  to  explain  how
genuine consent can be sought, since the option of taking tests that are not compulsory but seen
as useful for credibility assessment would put pressure on other applicants to take the tests, thus
undermining the validity of any consent obtained. Finally, should the CJEU agree with the use of
projective personality tests in SOGI asylum claims, it would compromise the progressive steps
previously taken in this area – a slippery slope we strongly hope the Court will not enter. The
CJEU has already spelled out,  in A, B and C,  some of  the crucial  elements for  deciding the
present  case;  now, it  is  a matter of entrenching those elements,  so as not  to leave room for
ambiguity or for the use of evidentiary means that are in breach of asylum seekers’ dignity and
fundamental rights.
The authors wish to thank the useful comments provided by Dr Carmelo Danisi and Dr Moira
Dustin on previous drafts of this text.
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